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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
force the Gegauf patent against the Japanese.2 2 The written agreements
between Gegauf and Singer in no way mention an agreement to exclude
the Japanese, nor was any evidence adducd showing that a verbal agree-
ment existed. Moreover, no showing was made that Gegauf had any power
to enforce such an agreement, if made, against Singer. The trial court, far
from finding a conspiracy to exclude the Japanese, found that the "domi-
nant and sole purpose of the license agreement was to settle the conflict
in priority. '23 The Supreme Court found this holding to be clearly er-
roneous and reversed the conclusions of the District Court.
The Singer case should stand as a warning to those who must advise
clients relative to their bargaining for the exchange of patents or rights
thereunder. Where a common motive exists to enforce the patents against
infringers, and litigation to exclude the infringer results, little more is
required to establish an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade.
22 E.g., "We agree that something should be done against Japanese competition in
your country and maybe South America .... [I]t may be possible that we can both
strengthen our positions with respect to the Japanese competition which you men-
tion. . . ." United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 184 (1963).
23 United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 205 F. Supp. 394 (1962).
ASSOCIATIONS AND SOCIETIES: RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES-
PROTECTION OF ENTRUSTED PROPERTY AGAINST
CHANGE IN FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES
The Landmark Baptist Church of Traskwood, Arkansas, functioning
on property restricted by three deeds to the use of "Landmark Baptists,"
was rent with a dissension which matured in a bill by the minority group
of church members to enjoin the pastor and majority faction from using
the church property. Their assertion was that the property was subject to
a trust under which the church premises must be used only to promote the
doctrine of the Landmark Baptist Church; and that the pastor had and
was teaching doctrines fundamentally, basically, and radically different
from the faith of a Landmark Baptist Church in violation of that trust.
The bill seeking to enjoin and eject the majority faction failed in the
Chancery Court of Saline County, Arkansas, but this decision became re-
versed in the Supreme Court of that state. At a subsequent rehearing, the
Supreme Court extended the injunction and ejected the majority faction
from the property. Holiman v. Dovers, 336 S.W. 2d 197 (Ark. 1963).
In a case of this sort with constitutional overtones, it is necessary to
establish: the court's jurisdiction where religious matter is involved; the
rights of a minority in this congregational, independent church; the trust
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upon the property; the violation of the trust by promotion of fundamen-
tally opposed doctrines; and, the weight of evidence necessary before the
court can determine doctrines and radical departures from them.
Conscious of the theory of separation between church and state,' the
courts will not entertain to resolve disputes of an ecclesiastical nature.
2
However, when an ecclesiastical controversy would involve the rights to
or possession of property upon judicial resolution, then the courts have
determined to have proper jurisdiction and authority to hear the matter.3
In truth, even when the case turns solely upon determinations of ecclesias-
tical doctrines and laws, the court is under obligation to adjudicate them
so long as a property right is involved.4 Ordinarily the bench will not
hear the matter until all resorts to higher church council have been ex-
hausted, but where, as here, the church is independent or congregational,
a resort to court action is the only way to resolve doctrinal departures. 5
In the instant case, this land has been and is deeded to "Landmark
Baptists." Such conveyances usually are set up to trustees for the use of
a particular church.0 But even where such a trust is not expressed in the
deed to a church, the law will imply such a trust for use only by and in
accordance with the named faith.7 It becomes a matter of law that a
breach of use will result in a forfeiture of the rights of the users; more
specifically, that the land must not be employed for or diverted to a kind
of worship differing substantially from the practice of the named church
or faith.8
1 U.S. CoNsT., amends. I and XIV.
2 Stewart v. Darriel, 206 Ga. X855, 59 S.E.2d 36 (1950); Purcell v. Summers, 35 F.
Supp. 421 (D.C.S.C. 1940); Bailey v. Washington, 236 Ala. 674, 185 So. 172 (1938);
Coleman v. Swanson, 293 11. App. 622, 11 N.E.2d 840 (1937).
3 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 679 (1869); Bramlett v. Young, 229 S.C. 519, 93
S.E.2d 873 (1956); Conic v. Cobbins, 208 Miss. 203, 44 So.2d 52 (1950); Hatfield v. Cum-
mins, 171 Ind. 112,85N.E. 359 (1908); Monk v. Little, 122 Ark. 7, 182 S.W. 511 (1916).
4 Schwartz v. Jacobs, 352 S.W. 2d 389 (Mo. 1961); Katz v. Goldman, 33 Ohio App.
150, 168 N.E. 763 (1929); Zollman, American Civil Church Law, 77 Columbia U.
Studies, 215 et seq. But see Kelley v. Mclntire, 123 N.J. Eq. 351, 197 Atl. 736 (1938),
where the court would not adjudicate dispute of faith and doctrine, where suit was to
enjoin pastor and other members from using the property for purposes other than in
accord with customs, constitution, and usages of the denominations. Tending to the
same, see Wehmer v. Fodenga, 57 Neb. 510, 78 N.W. 28 (1899).
5 Beard v. Francis, 45 Tenn pp. 513, 309 S.W.2d 788 (1957); Hatchett v. Mt. Pleasant
Baptist, 46 Ark. 291 (1885); German Reformed Church v. Commonwealth, 3 Pa. St. 282
(1846).
6 Bahos v. Takach, 14 Ohio App. 370, (1921); Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. 303, 18 S.W.
874 (1892).
7 Wheeless v. Barrett, 229 N.C. 282, 49 S.E.2d 629 (1948); Odoms v. Woodall, 246
Ala. 427, 20 So.2d 849 (1945); Hennessey v. Walsh, 55 N.H. 515 (1898).
8 In re Craig's Estate, 356 Pa. 564, 52 A.2d 650 (1947); First Regular Church of Indi-
ana, Pa. v. Allison, 304 Pa. 1, 154 Atl. 913 (1931).
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An examination of the authorities reveals a well established principle
that the control of all the affairs of an independent, self governed con-
gregational church belongs to the majority of that church.9
As an exception to this rule it is established by the weight of authority, that
the majority of each independent or congregational society . . . may not, as
against a faithful minority, divert the property ... to the support of doctrines
radically and fundamentally opposed to the characteristic doctrines of the
society, even though the property is subject to no express trust.10
The difficulty in applying the rule rises under the foreboding presence
of the first amendment which unequivocally separates church and state,"
prohibits judicial determination of religious doctrine, and which is made
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.12 But the
same authority reveals that this separation need not be absolute. 1" Con-
cerning the situation in point, it has been held that the amendment does
not prohibit equity jurisdiction and control that property shall be admin-
istered according to the purposes to which it has been dedicated. 14
It is here that the problem lies. How can the keeper of temporal justice
avoid making determinations of ecclesiastics? Where a dispute involving
property depends upon such determinations, the court must determine:
(a) what is the fundamental doctrine of the church, (b) what is the
doctrine held by the factions, and (c) whether there has been a funda-
mental or radical departure from the doctrine of the church. It is con-
clusive that matters of faith, morals, and pure ecclesiastics cannot be
taken under judicial notice.15 Neither is the bench at liberty to arrive at
9 Rush v. Yancey, 233 Ark. 883, 349 S.W.2d 337 (1961); Booker v. Smith, 214 Ark.
102, 214 S.W.2d 513 (1948); Elston v. Wilborn, 208 Ark. 377, 186 S.W.2d 662 (1945);
Kidwell v. Crawford, 298 Ky. 380, 182 S.W.2d 968 (1944).
10 Mitchell v. Church of Christ, 128 So. 781, 783, 221 Ala. 315, 317 (1930); See Wat-
son v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1869); Nagle v. Miller, 275 Pa. 157, 118 At. 670
(1922); Christian Church v. Crystal, 78 Cal. App. 1, 274 Pac. 605 (1926). The rule has
found application also in Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, N.
Hampshire, N. Jersey, N. York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin. But see First Baptist Church of Paris
v. Fort, 93 Tex. 215, 54 S.W. 892 (1899); and Wehmer v. Fodenga, 57 Neb. 510, 78
N.W. 28 (1899).
11 Lewis v. Allen, 207 N.Y.S. 2d 862 (1956); Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
12 U.S. CONsT., amend. XIV. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. ..
18 Accord, Baer v. Kolmorgen, 181 N.Y.S. 2d 230 (1958).
14 St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox v. Kreshik, 196 N.Y.S. 2d 655, 164
N.E. 2d 687 (1959), rev'd. on other grounds; Ward v. Crisp, 189 Tenn. 513, 226 S.W.2d
273 (1949).
15 Sweeney v. Newspaper Printing, 177 Tenn. 196, 147 S.W.2d 406 (1941); Kompier
v. Thegza, 213 Ind. 542, 13 N.E.2d 229 (1937); Freidman v. Swift, 18 F. Supp. 596
(D.C.N.Y. 1937).
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legal conclusions with respect to religion.16 Yet the three conclusions
above must be drawn, and the only recourse left is to treat doctrine as a
matter of fact; therefore, what is and what is not fundamental belief must
be resolved through the evidence as it sheds light upon the court.
17
In this endeavor, fearful of first amendment infringement, the procedure
of the courts has been to view doctrinal differences only as matters of
evidence with determinative effect to the main issue-who has the right to
possession and use of the property.'8 Once having assumed this stance,
the danger of giving legal definition to a sect's doctrines becomes remote.
A church's beliefs are a changing, at least growing body. Therefore, while
the doctrines of the Landmark Baptists may change, they are nonetheless
the same religious group now as before. The courts attempt only to dis-
cover and determine which doctrines "at the time of the wrongful use"
are considered fundamental.' 9
Ordinarily in a court of equity the bill need be supported and estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence. 20 But in cases at equity where
the relief prayed for would result in the deprivation of property and use
of it, the accepted rule is that the proof must be clear and convincing be-
fore the decree or injunction will lie. 2 ' Of the few cases exactly in point,
favor is lent to the requirement of more than a preponderance where the
determination is of fundamental church doctrine. There is not only the
possible anomaly of judicial interpretation of religious doctrine, but a
very real danger that a lack of weighty evidence has worked a forfeiture
under the due process clause, in light of the first amendment prohibition.
22
16 Though in some instances, when either the statement or act of belief is obviously
antagonistic and dangerous to the integrity of the state, the court can impose summary
sanction. McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); United States v. Mo-
hammed, 288 F.2d 236 (C.A.Ill. 1961).
17 See Chesire v. Giles, 144 Va. 253, 122 S.E. 479 (1926).
I8 First English Lutheran Church v. Block, 195 Okla. 579, 159 P.2d 1006 (1945); Davis
v. Turner, 148 S.W.2d 256 (C.A.Tex. 1941).
19 Holiman v. Dovers, 366 S.W.2d 197 (Ark. 1963); Davis v. Scher, 356 Mich. 291, 97
N.W.2d 137 (1959).
20 Home Mortgage v. Ramsey, 49 F.2d 738 (1920); Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 Utah
575, 206 Pac. 262 (1922).
21 Pierce v. N.Y. Dock Co., N.Y., 265 F. 148 (1920); Duvall v. Hambleton, 98 Md.
12, 55 Atl. 431(1903); Vansciver v. Bryan, 13 N.J. Eq. 434 (1861).
22 While under the rule, even the slightest preponderance may weight the case in
favor of one or the other party, some implication or forecast of probability on the part
of the court may still be necessary in order to conclude a departure from doctrine. In
light of the fact that the first amendment, via the fourteenth, prohibits even such
slight activity by the court in interpretation of religious docrine, can such a decision
meet the qualification of due process? However sure and direct the speculation may be,
the incontrovertible fact remains that to support the finding the court was required to
say, "it seems to be," or "it is most probable." Only one instance is found where the
absolute demands of the first amendment were relaxed. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Rus-
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The better view, considering the real possibility of such judicial intru-
sions, follows Lord Halsbury's summation of this sensible attitude in his
practical refusal to "speculate as to what is or is not important in the
views held." 2 "The fact that property was impressed with a specific
trust, and abuse of such trust, must be clearly established." 24
While the search of authorities has revealed no case in which the court
has demanded such "decided weight," the inference is strong that the
court will not determine departures from fundamental doctrines in its
absence. 25 Relief was twice refused in the face of conflicting testimony
when such departure was not clearly shown.26 In another adjudication
when the evidence did not clearly support a doctrinal departure, the court
stated that it "would conclude from the evidence, though with some
doubt, that the synod had not departed from such faith and doctrine. '27
"To justify interference it must be shown that the purpose of the ma-
jority is .... (manifest) beyond all reasonable doubt. ' 28 Such statements
are supported by affirmed decisions on lateral issues involving a disavow-
al of right, and equitable relief against another's legal right.29
Some isolated jurisdictions have been found which expressed the opinion
that a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to sustain the bill, but
these may be excused as a failure by the court to use precise language for
the cases appear to be amply supported by their evidence. 80
Wariness is the keyword in the application of this rule, for any slight
misapplication might easily violate the articles of our Bill of Rights, whose
purpose it is the court's interest to protect and promote.81
sian Orthodox v. Kreshik, 196 N.Y.S.2d 655, 164 N.E.2d 687 (1959) stated, "This amend-
ment does not stand in the way of judicial requirement under principles of equitable
jurisdiction that property of a religious society shall be administered according to pur-
poses to which it has been dedicated."
23 Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun, A.C. 515, 613 (1904) (H.L.).
24 Trustees of Pecader Presbyterian v. Gibson, 26 Del. Ch. 375, 388, 22 A.2d 782, 794
(1941).
25 Cleaver v. Conference of African Union, 99 U.S. App. D.C. 371, 240 F.2d 57
(1956); Caples v. Nazareth Church of Hopewell, 245 Ala. 656, 18 So. 2d 383 (1944);
Holiman v. Dovers, 366 S.W.2d 197 (Ark 1963).
28Fort Worth Primitive Baptist Church v. Fischer, 237 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1951);
Wadell v. Goldin, 211 G. 820, 89 S.E.2d 170 (1955).
27 Dressen v. Brainier, 56 Ia. 756, 760, 9 N.W. 193, 197 (1881).
28 Mitchell v. Church of Christ, 128 So. 781, 784, 221 Ala. 315, 318 (1930); See also,
Hale 1. Everett, 53 N.H. 9 (1868).
29 Duvall v. Hambleton, 98 Md. 12, S5 Adt. 431 (1903); Vansciver v. Bryan, 13 N.J.
Eq. 434 (1861).
8OSapp. v. Callaway, 208 Ga. 805, 69 S.E.2d 734 (1952); Fadness v. Braunborg, 73
Wis. 253,41 N.W. 84 (1889).
31 For a further discussion of the problems involved in judicial intervention in
church disputes, see note, Judicial Intervention in disputes over the use of church
property, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1142 (1962).
